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Abstract 
Proportionate Reciprocity, Modesty, and Democracy, are the key concepts in Aristotle’s economics of 
exchange. The following correspondence of these concepts with modern social science may be 
contemplated: (a) Ideally, reciprocal justice in bilateral bargaining to minimize expenditure given utility 
levels results in Pareto-efficient, envy-free, equitable outcomes. (b) Practically, bargaining under the 
threat or actual recontracting may act as a surrogate of reciprocal justice, leading to an N-person contract 
topology. (c) But, recontracting is subject to practical limitations too, in which case near-reciprocal 
justice/general equilibrium outcomes may be fostered if, as a surrogate of recontracting, modesty in 
interaction is exhibited in an evolutionarily-stable-strategy fashion. (d) That is, incomplete recontracting 
amounts to asymmetric agent-type information, which in turn lays the ground for injustices; the same lack 
of information prevents rectificatory justice from being efficient and hence, modesty can be efficient only if 
it operates as a social norm and hence, only in a modest polity, which can be no other than democracy.  
Keywords: reciprocal justice, reciprocal figures, general equilibrium, modesty              
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1. Introduction 
Book V of Aristotle’s (384-322 BC) Nicomachean Ethics has elicited the 
attention of economists, because it contains Aristotle’s economics of exchange. It is the 
economics implied by the concept of reciprocal justice, two-way justice or two-way 
equality in a mutual fashion so to speak, which type of justice is possible to exercise only 
in voluntary two-person exchange in the private sector. We shall see that it is specifically 
the concept which has come to be known, from the 1670s and on, as the Golden Rule or 
Law, or Ethic of Reciprocity. In its positive form, this rule urges to “Treat others how 
you wish to be treated”, while in its negative form, “One should not treat others in ways 
that one would not like to be treated”, (Flew 1979, p.134). This connection of exchange 
with this type of justice is the reason why according to historians of thought, jurists and 
theologians were the first to become interested in this subject matter, (see e.g. Gordon, 
1975). 
From the debate permutatio vs. emptio-venditio (barter vs. monetized exchange) 
and the concept of iustum pretium (just price) of the Justinian account of the Roman-
Byzantine law, Corpus Juris Civilis (534 AD), to the medieval extension of the doctrine 
laesius enormis (excessive inheritance) embodied in this law, by Carloman’s notion of 
negocium (business transaction) in his Capitula (884 AD) and by the revivalists of this 
law in the Bologna School of Law founded by Irnerius in 1084 AD. And, subsequently, 
from S. Thomae Aquinatis’ Summa Theologica (1265/7-1273 AD) and the Scholastics 
(1300-1600 AD) to Venerable Leonard Lessius’ De Justitia et Jure (1605 AD) and the 
dawn of present-day economics by Adam Smith. 
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Consequently, an understanding of the Aristotelian economics of exchange should 
also be able to provide an understanding of the post-Aristotelian approaches to exchange 
and price formation. We see, for example, that the following mentality of the Schoolmen, 
described by Gordon (1975, p. 260), mirrors Aristotle: “Most Schoolmen assumed that 
even in the absence of monopoly, markets were rarely perfect. Some lack of knowledge 
must almost be present and could be tolerated by the moralist.” Also, Blaug (1991) 
mentions claims that Aristotle anticipated Jevon’s theory of exchange and Menger’s 
theory of imputation.  And, Jaffe (1974) maintains−as we do too, herein, but absolved 
from the “obscurities in Book V” (Jaffe 1974, p. 385), which in the author’s opinion 
plague Jaffe, too− that even Edgeworth’s contract curve is Aristotelian in origin.  
Some, of course, like Schumpeter (1954), Meikle (1995), and Rothbard (1995) 
see no economics in the Aristotelian economics of exchange, Ludwig von Mises (1963 
[1949]) claims that these economics are simply fallacious while others like Theocarakis 
(2006, p. 9) think that “…the attempt to base subsequent economic analysis on his canon 
is utterly untenable.”…or in terms of Pack’s (2008, p. 265) approach, “…Aristotle’s 
views are completely at odds with all modern economic theory” though “…definitely… of 
interest to some heterodox economists” (p. 278). Yet, the recent tendency to be finding 
arguments refuting Aristotle just because the academia’s position nowadays is that “[t]he 
Aristotelian ideal that the world is rational, and if we try hard enough we can use our 
own rationality to really grasp or approach that truth, is in retreat” (Pack 2008, p. 276), 
is equivalent to purposeful misinterpretation… 
Anyway, Theocarakis’ (2006) work does offer a recent critical history of 
Aristotle’s economics of exchange. One realizes going through this history that the 
source of the confusion about “Aristotelian exchange” is the confusion about the 
definition of the term “reciprocal figures” in Euclid’s Elements, (see e.g. Simpson, 1804), 
which opened the doors to all sorts of philosophical speculative and in the end futile 
thinking. The author, too, is inclined to “read Aristotle” with a philosophical eye, though, 
in my view, what he wanted to say is quite clear, because Euclid’s notion of reciprocity 
should be in line with the universal appeal of the Golden Rule as well, and hence, 
anything but obscure. Translations of Book V give a diagrammatic exposition of 
reciprocity too, attributing it to Aristotle; but if there was indeed a figure in the original 
text, it must had been a Euclidean geometric exposition, which “who knows” how it 
ended up to Nicolas Oresme’s poor and inaccurate as we shall see diagram. Now, let us 
take things one at time. 
A discussion of the Aristotelian price theory is prompted usually by the views he 
held about the other forms of economic justice, which are the following two: First, 
exchange in the absence of reciprocal justice would be involuntary and hence, subject to 
rectificatory justice, which: “…has nothing to do with punishment proper but is only that 
of rectifying a wrong that has been done, by awarding damages; i.e. rectificatory justice 
is that of the civil, not of the criminal courts…[I]t brings A to the position A+C, and B to 
the position B-C. The judge’s task is to find the arithmetical mean between these, and this 
he does by transferring C from A to B.” (Ross 1923, p. 300) 
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And, second, exchange in the realm of public economy should be governed by 
distributive justice, “which distributes common possessions…in accordance with the kind 
of proportion mentioned above”, (Ethics, 1131b:28-30), that is, in accordance with the 
geometric progression, “(for in the case also in which the distribution is made from the 
common funds of a partnership it will be according to the same ratio which the funds put 
into the business by the partners bear to one another)”, (Ethics, 1131b:30-33) 
Now, the question that usually prompts a discussion of reciprocal justice is that if 
rectificatory and distributive justice are marked by the arithmetic and the geometric 
proportion, respectively, shouldn’t there be a proportion underlying reciprocal justice, 
too? Indeed, voluntary two-person exchange is governed by proportionate reciprocity. 
According to the second definition in the sixth book of Euclid’s Elements: “Two 
magnitudes are said to be reciprocally proportional to two others when one of the first is 
to one of the other magnitudes as the remaining one of the last two is to the remaining 
one of the first.” That is, given A/B, terms A and D will be reciprocally proportional to 
terms B and C when they satisfy both of the proportions A/B:C/D and A/B:D/C. For 
example, in 3/1:2/6, 3 is to 6 as 1 is to 2, or 3/6=1/2. And, in 3/1:6/2, 3 is to 6 as 1 is to 2, 
or again, 3/6=1/2. The reciprocity lies in that C/D may become D/C and nothing else 
change: A/D=B/C in either case, which equality is what makes reciprocity to be 
geometrically constructible.  
Returning back to Aristotle’s exchange economics, we shall see that in this 
example, C= , D= , where p is price and x=A and y=B are quantities of the goods x 
and y by traders A and B. For now, it suffices to point out the connection of relationship 
A/D=B/C with Golden Rule: It is a relationship, summarizing according to Book V the 
characteristics of traders A and B. The understanding of Aristotelian economics of 
exchange rests upon the understanding of these characteristics. Do they reflect a utility 
approach to exchange or a producer-cost theory of value or both? And, it is only the 
characteristics of traders A and B and their bargaining capacity that matter in determining 
the ratio C/D or it is also the market, what others do, that matters as well? These are the 
questions which have been puzzling implicitly or explicitly analysts of Aristotle’s views 
on exchange all along.  
The current thesis is that: “Aristotle’s limit on determination of the terms of trade 
appear to be broad social determinants, bound up with inequalities of social status or 
acquired skills of the persons responsible for production and exchange…Aristotle is 
endeavouring to relate establishment of just terms of trade to that general framework of 
social realities which condition and mould the interactions of economic variables.”, 
(Gordon 1975, p. 69) I attribute this thesis to the mistaken perception of the elements 
entering distributive justice as elements influencing reciprocal justice, too. This mistaken 
approach blurs the thematic structure and subsequently, the understanding of Book V as 
it stands regardless the possible “corruptions of the text perpetrated by countless 
generations of copyists”. (Jaffe 1974, p. 385) 
The thesis advanced herein has a follows: Aristotle develops first a bilateral trade 
model that arrives at two-person equilibrium on the basis of the need of and output 
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produced by each trader. Bargaining based on reciprocal justice will result in a Pareto-
efficient, envy-free, equitable outcome. Next, as very well Winthrop (1978) observes, 
Aristotle points out that all this is theory based on the assumption of choosing to do 
justice rather than injustice when for some reason one of the bargaining parties can do 
have such a choice. In the absence of reciprocal justice, agents bargaining in a 
recontracting fashion will end up in a general equilibrium in which an excess demand by 
a particular trader is also in aggregate excess demand. But, the real world is one in which 
neither recontracting can match the outcome of reciprocal justice.  
It takes modesty on the part of traders to minimize injustice, which modesty in 
turn may be exhibited only in the context of a democracy. A discussion of the choice 
between exchange justice (and any other kind of justice) and injustice should not be 
abstract, but brought down to the practice of people in a democracy, to see what can 
make these people come closer to the theoretical standard. The answer is “modesty” (in 
exchange and in any in general interaction) in an evolutionary-stable-strategy fashion, 
fostering not only market exchange justice but also the continuity of all social norms 
upon which a virtuous democratic society is founded. Modesty consists of unconditional 
trustworthiness and informal only sanctions in case of injustice. Democracy-modesty as 
the basis of free choice is what differentiates Aristotle from the other evolutionary 
models of cooperation vs. self-interest like those of Falk et al. (2005), Fehr and Gachter 
(2000), Guttman (2003), and Ostrom (2000). 
2. On Proportionate Reciprocity 
Proportionate reciprocity is advanced in Chapter 5 of Book V. It is advanced 
within the context of barter exchange between 1133a:7 and 1133b:12, but not before an 
introduction to reciprocity per se by the same chapter. It is neither the “an-eye-for-an-
eye” notion of reciprocity occupied by game theory and elsewhere nowadays (see e.g. 
Gouldner, 1960; MacCormack, 1976; or Molm, 2010) nor any of the notions advanced by 
the standard modern works on Book V, from Grant (1885) to Ross (1923) and Stewart 
(1973). Aristotle’s introduction to reciprocity really says that although the deals with the 
public or the courts may not engender the reciprocity one would expect from a deal, such 
reciprocity does exist in voluntary exchange. It consists of doing a trader business putting 
his feet into the shoes of the trader with whom he is trading in so far as the “fairness” of 
the terms of trade is concerned.  The main discussion of proportionate reciprocity is 
followed by a discussion of monetary exchange, too, between 1133b:12 and 1133b:33 in 
the same chapter. 
In my opinion, the key passages from the main discussion and their interpretation 
have as follows: “If then there is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal 
action takes place, the result we mention will be effected.” (Ethics, 1133a:12-14) The 
“result” is, of course, proportionate reciprocity. If, for example, the equality of three 
kilograms of wheat with one pair of shoes is agreed upon by a wheat farmer and a 
shoemaker, and then two such pairs are exchanged for six kilograms of wheat, 
proportionate reciprocity will have been effected.  
But, what determines these terms of trade? Two things; intensity of need and 
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production technology: “…all things that are exchanged must be somehow 
comparable…All goods must…be measured by some one thing…Now this unit is χρεία 
(need),…; but money has become by convention a representative of need.” (Ethics, 
1133a:22-35) And, “There will be then reciprocity when the terms have been equated so 
that as farmer is to shoemaker, the shoemaker’s έργον (productive effort) is to that of the 
farmer’s productive effort for which it exchanges.” (Ethics, 1133a:38-40) 
That is, the amount of money the shoemaker/farmer offers for the 
farmer’s/shoemaker’s product shows “how badly” one needs the product of the other. 
And, when the ratio of the amounts of money offered becomes proportional to the ratio of 
the volume of outputs offered for exchange in the fashion: 
 
 
that is, when the farmer/shoemaker thinks that what he would be willing to pay for 
wheat/shoes if he was a shoemaker/farmer is what actually the shoemakers/farmer offers 
to him, proportionate reciprocity will have been effected. Note parenthetically, that there 
is as much labor theory of value and utility theory in Aristotle as needed to put forward 
these expressions; we shall see that not even economics per se is his primary concern, let 
alone the development of a theory of value… 
Anyway, the proportions mentioned in the introductory section of this tract reflect 
this wheat-shoes example, with A/B≡wheat/shoes and C/D≡offer for wheat/offer for 
shoes, and proportionate reciprocity is given alternatively by the relationship: 
A/D=B/C=>C/D=B/A, i.e. by the equalities, 
 
 
or numerically, by 3/1=6/2, which, however, equality cannot be achieved before the 
satisfaction of the following proviso, too: “…we must not bring them into a figure of 
proportion when they have already exchanged (otherwise one άκρον (end of the 
bargaining) will have both υπεροχάς (advantages)), but when they still have their own 
goods.” (Ethics, 1133a:4D-1133b:3) 
This passage does two things: First, the part “when they still have their own 
goods” introduces as the basis of bargaining the budget constraints: 
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and   
 
where A and B are two persons specializing in the production of good y and x and having 
produced  and  respectively, ,   is the volume of y to be exchanged 
for x to get   and   is the volume of x to be traded to 
get    
Second, the two “advantages” in the parentheses above are one from being a 
seller and selling high, and one from being a buyer and buying low. Consequently, the 
whole phrase in the parentheses states that the double unilateral advantage that it 
mentions, is not desirable as a solution to bargaining. It follows that the second point of 
the passage is that the outcome of bargaining will be in accordance with proportionate 
reciprocity if it eliminates excess demands and supplies.  
Indeed, adding prices  and  into the discussion, reciprocity becomes 
equivalent to recognition that: 
 
and proportionate reciprocity will have been effected when: 
 
or the same, by the relationship: 
 
since at these equilibrium prices, either  or 
 imply that   or the same, that , 
which yields the above relationship. Are prices  and  “individualized” prices, the 
outcome of bilateral bargaining, differing across bargaining couples in the market of a 
product?  
If there is no recontracting, the answer will be in the affirmative: The quantities to 
be exchanged are as fixed as the ratio A/B in the above proportions, which in turn implies 
that two traders bargain to settle that ratio C/D≡  which would minimize both the 
individual and joint expenditure needed to ascertain a certain utility level on the part of 
each trader. By Shephard’s Lemma, the resulting demand curves will be the Hicksian 
rather than the Marshallian ones. Hence, at first sight it appears that reciprocal justice 
wants the bargaining parties behaving in their role as sellers, as monopolists exercising 
first degree price discrimination, appropriating each the consumer-cum-producer surplus 
of the other under prices equaling marginal production costs. And, of course, the 
similarity of production conditions is one reason why   and  should not be differing 
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across bargaining parties. 
But, this is not the whole “story”; it is a warning that without market search via 
the threat of or actual recontracting, one of the two parties may be victimized by the 
exchange, because the consumer-cum-producer surplus lost will most likely exceed the 
surplus gained by one of the two parties: “…one who gives what is his own, as Homer 
says Glaucus gave Diomede ‘Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves 
for nine’, is not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his power, to be unjustly treated 
is not, but there must be someone to treat him unjustly. It is plain, then, that being 
unjustly treated is not voluntary.” (Ethics, 1136b:10-15).  
Glaucus was clearly victimized by Diomede despite the presence of voluntariness, 
because: “…if a man assigns more to another than to himself, knowingly and voluntarily, 
he treats himself unjustly; which is what modest people seem to do, since the virtuous 
man tends to take less than his share. Or does this statement too needs qualification? For 
(a) he perhaps gets more than his share of some other good, e.g. of honour or of intrinsic 
nobility…” (Ethics, 1136b:18-23). Glaucus showed to Diomede nobility. Yet, strictly in 
economic terms, exchange resulting in wealth redistribution a la Glaucus-Diomede is not 
reciprocal justice; only the “voluntary” part of it is. 
The notion of reciprocal justice becomes complete by noting that the other, the 
main reason, why the price of any product should be unique in a monetized economy, is 
that: “…all goods must have a price set on them”, (Ethics, 1133b:17). It follows that the 
price tag for a good should be reflecting the lower production cost of it as a matter of 
seller competition. Consequently, what Aristotle wants to say is that agents, being aware 
of the wealth-loss eventuality if they do not bargain within the broader context of 
recontracting to obtain all the price information needed before the act of exchange, they 
will simply bargain in a recontracting fashion; and by doing so the duality between 
Hicksian and Marshallian demand may be attained. That is, reciprocal justice does not 
come about based solely upon the good will of the bargaining parties, but by trying 
actively each party to enforce such a will by the other party through recontracting: 
Aristotle couldn’t possibly ignore ancient Greek drama’s maxim that: God helps those 
who help themselves… 
But, again, if there are price tags, what is the use of bargaining? Which is the 
precise content of recontracting? Consider toward this end a general decentralized 
equilibrium of N-2 agents, having set the N-2 market-clearing price tags of two goods. 
The remaining 2 agents continue bargaining, leaving open the eventuality of ending up in 
terms of trade which need not be identical with those in the N-2 market. Consequently, if 
the prices on price tags are to be unique, all bargaining is pre-equilibrium bargaining, and 
can have only the meaning of recontracting, because, in the absence of an auctioneer, 
only recontracting can result in single market prices.  
Aristotle is not explicit in that because his main concern was not economics but 
justice in the city, (and/or because of corruptions in the text…). He is preoccupied with 
what will happen to the city if price tags do not reflect reciprocal justice: “For it is by 
proportionate requital that the city holds together”, (Ethics, 1132b:36-39). And, he 
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advances the price-tag argument under a mentality no different than “…when channel 
members are concerned about fairness, the manufacturer can use a simple wholesale 
price above her marginal cost to coordinate this channel both in terms of achieving the 
maximum channel profit and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility. Thus, 
channel coordination may not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant 
wholesale price will do.” (Cui et al. 2007, p. 1303). Aristotle would add that sellers care 
for fairness in the first place, because of the fear of recontracting; price tags try to 
preempt it. 
In other words, reciprocal justice is Aristotle’s version of recontracting, and at a 
general equilibrium level, the result is an N-person Edgeworth/Walrasian contract 
topology. Edgeworth and Walras isolate from Book V its economics, and present it in a 
formal way. For Walras (1969 [1874], §99): “The exchange of two commodities for each 
other in a perfectly competitive market is an operation by which all holders of either one, 
or of both of the two commodities can obtain the greatest possible satisfaction of their 
wants consistent with the condition that the two commodities are bought and sold at one 
and the same rate of exchange throughout the market.” And, also: “According to Walras, 
it is not by violating the principle of ‘justice in exchange’ that the injustices of the 
existing distribution of property are corrected, but by applying another set of principles, 
those of ‘distributive justice’." (Jaffe 1977, p. 373) That is, just exchange leaves wealth 
(property) distribution intact, which if it is to be altered, it should be altered by public 
policy: All in line with Book V except for the public-policy part which breaks the ground 
for the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. For Aristotle, income 
redistribution might be thought of as being replaced by honor-nobility redistribution. 
As very nicely Van Johnson (1939) remarks, reciprocal justice is equating agents 
in the following fashion by design: “For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, 
but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people who are different and unequal; but these 
must be equated.” (Ethics, 1133a:20-22). Trade should not be altering the relative 
socioeconomic position of the trading parties, because if it did, if one became richer at 
the expense of the other, there would not be reciprocal justice: “…the justice in 
transactions between man and man is a sort of equality indeed, and the injustice a sort of 
inequality…”, (Ethics, 1131b:33-34). Exchange induced equitability issues are thus not 
raised. Enviousness issues are not raised too, and moreover, Pareto efficiency will be 
insured when reciprocal justice in exchange amounts to putting himself a trader in the 
other trader’s place and making−now we shall add−the other trader do the same. This is 
the definition of reciprocal justice as an ideal. 
But, by the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics, not even Pareto 
efficiency alone can be achieved through the free market system before lump-sum 
transfers and subsidies are effected among the agents. Aristotle does recognize this 
possibility, but urges “modesty” and thereby, honor and nobility in exchange (as in 
everything else) instead of government intervention. Aristotle dismisses income 
redistribution even from the viewpoint of the second welfare theorem, because who 
would consent to an income loss for the sake of Pareto efficiency? Instead, one should 
run to the judge for rectificatory justice. This plus the idealistic character of reciprocal 
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justice are the reasons making Aristotle dismiss market (exchange) as a principal factor 
shaping citizen behavior and practice (see e.g. Winthrop, 1978) although he does 
acknowledge the inevitability of the institution of the market. He thus addresses the 
nobility each man has inside him to make him act in a modest way as a way of attaining 
not only near-Pareto efficiency but near-genuine democracy as well: Once man chose to 
exchange and become homo economicus, this can be done more efficiently as a homo 
politicus, much more so when exchange without society is impossible. Then and only 
then one might consent to a Pareto efficiency seeking income redistribution… 
This is in sum the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of proportionate 
reciprocity advanced herein. It is the core concept behind a microfoundation of city 
socioeconomics, and of course, a discussion of “modesty” and to what “honor and 
nobility” amount to in practice, is necessary to complete his overall approach to this 
subject. Such a discussion follows immediately in the next section, concluding this one 
with a remark on the role of money. Although the passages from Book V we used did 
mention money, the phrases “offer for wheat” and “offer for shoes” did not, connoting 
offers either in kilograms of wheat and pairs shoes, respectively, or in money: “…for it 
makes no difference whether it is five beds that exchange for a house, or the money value 
of five beds”, (Ethics, 1133b:32-33) 
3. On Modesty 
Book V is divided into two parts. One, until chapter 5, elaborates upon the 
principles of justice, and the other, after chapter 5, elaborates upon the issues that have to 
be taken into account for the practical conformity to these principles in a democracy. 
Chapter 6 starts by noting that: “…we must not forget that what we are looking for is not 
only what is just without qualification but also political justice. This is found among men 
who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who are free and equal…” 
(Ethics, 1134a:29-32). Political justice consists of natural and legal justice (Ethics, 
1134b:23-30). Natural justice is that which is universally true like the fire that: “…burns 
both here and in Persia…” (Ethics, 1134b:33). Legal justice depends on societal form, 
referring to: “…things which are just not by nature but by human enactment [and] are not 
everywhere the same…” (Ethics, 1135a:4-7). And, according to Politics, the best by 
nature societal form is democracy, because it is: “…the less evil form of government 
since it does not deviate much from the kind of governance (exercised) by citizens 
themselves” (Politics, 1160b:22-24) 
The keyword for the understanding of the context in which the notions of 
exchange justice and modesty are advanced and hence, for the thorough understanding of 
these notions per se, is the phrase “best by nature”; especially so given that this phrase 
does not refer to natural justice. Nature, refers to the voluntary rather than coercive 
foundation of society, including market interaction, which is: “…the most elementary 
means to self-sufficiency, for the sake of which it is believed that people formed societ”, 
(Politics, 1321b:17-19). Or, in modern terms, to those social norms and institutions that 
have prevailed in an evolutionarily-stable-strategy fashion, the strategy choice being the 
one between justice and injustice, which choice can be made freely and in favor thereby 
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of justice, only by: “…people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled”, 
(Ethics, 1134b:18-19). Such people can simply behave with modesty, being just and 
tolerating injustice without fearing that this attitude will be taken as a weakness, because 
they do have the option to exercise the eye-for-an-eye justice of Rhadamanthus: “Should 
a man suffer what he did, the right justice would be done”, (Ethics, 1132b:31) 
Consequently, what should be the focus of a study towards societal betterment is 
the origin of the deviant strategy choice of doing the unjust in a democracy. What should 
be of concern is the choice of injustice broadly defined, and not confined to the economic 
being alone. This precisely concern is the subject matter of discussion after chapter 5 of 
Book V. The content of injustice has as follows: “Now when (1) the injury takes place 
contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a misadventure. When (2) it is not contrary to 
reasonable expectation but does not imply vice, it is a mistake…When (3) he acts with 
knowledge but not after deliberation, it is an act of injustice…But when (4) a man acts 
from choice, he is an unjust man and a vicious man” (Ethics, 1135b:19-29) In the first 
two instances, one: “…is not unjustly treated…[and] at most only suffers harm” (Ethics, 
1136b:25-30). Tolerance under these circumstances is meaningful and even in the case of 
act of injustice. 
But, one would not be immodest if one, aided by the police and courts, retaliated 
against a vicious man whom, however, one cannot know beforehand that he is such a 
man and avoid him. And, if the interaction with and injustice by such a man occur only 
once, which is logical to assume since…”fool me twice, shame on me”,…it will be 
uncertain if the injustice was done after deliberation or not. It is exactly this lack of 
interpersonal information which lays the ground for injustice as a strategy choice in a hit-
and-run fashion. Two interrelated questions come up immediately: Why doesn’t injustice 
spread? And, why all injustice is not countered by Rhadamanthus-style retaliation? The 
answers are equally interrelated, because both stem from the behavioral-public-good 
character of democracy as follows. 
First, note that pay-back-with-the-same-coin punishments should be decided by 
the civil (as opposed to penal) courts, not imposed by the victims themselves. And, it is 
precisely for this reason too, that retaliation is impossible, because which exactly is the 
“coin” if the plaintiff cannot tell viciousness from act of injustice and even further, from 
mistake or misadventure on the part of the suspect? In game-theoretic jargon, injustice is 
realized as a noisy signal about player type. In a democracy, this lack of information is 
particularly important, because modesty should be exercised by the judiciary as well, as 
crystallized into the Roman dictum: summum jus summa injuria. Indeed, court 
deliberations in a democracy have to take into account that: “…acting unjustly is the 
worse, for it involves vice and is blameworthy,…while being unjustly treated does not 
involve vice and injustice in oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad…” 
(Ethics, 1138a:37-42) 
So, if asymmetric information and modesty on the part of the judiciary should be 
exhibited for the same reason it is done on the part of the citizen, mild only convictions if 
any may produce. No Rhadamanthus-style retaliation is possible. But, how, then, 
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injustice does not spread? The answer according to Aristotle is by seeing democracy as a 
sociopolitical public good based on modesty as a social norm whose norm’s would-be 
negative consequences are a cost in favor of this good. Modesty not only on the part of 
the citizenry and of the judiciary but also of the statesmen and city (polis) executives: 
“…we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle, because a man behaves…in his 
own interests and becomes a tyrant” (Ethics, 1134a:42-1134b:1)  
That is, democracy and modesty are put forward by Aristotle in the same spirit 
modern game theory puts the provision of public goods in terms of social norms, which 
norm is: “…1) a behavioral regularity; that is 2) based on a socially shared belief of how 
one ought to behave; which triggers 3) the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by 
informal social sanctions. Thus, a social norm can be thought of as a sort of behavioral 
public good, in which everybody should make a positive contribution−that is, follow the 
social norm…” (Fehr and Gachter 2000, p. 166) The norm is a public good itself, and as 
far as modesty−tolerance, we would say today− is concerned, it is the top in virtue social 
norm because it is the virtue consistent most with the informality of sanctions against its 
violation, since modesty should be shown to sanctions against injustice as well.  
Spreading the word that “Mr. X deceived me” is believed to be enough to bring 
Mr. X back to order. This kind of cooperative behavior is advocated by Aristotle as a 
means of preserving the continuity of a democratic society. According to Politics 
(1320a:2-6), the continuity of a society depends more on the cooperative behavior 
making it possible than in the character of the society, which for a democracy means, 
more on modesty than in the democratic institutions. Consequently, modesty is a kind of 
cooperative interaction, which is not found in game theory even though (a) the “typical 
cooperator” of game theory is looked upon from the viewpoint of maintaining the societal 
arrangement of the interaction too, and (b) Ostrom’s (2000), for example, “conditional 
cooperators” does value the public-goods nature of reciprocity per se, deriving benefit 
beyond the objective payoff when they reciprocate trust with trust, but suffering from 
intrinsic costs when they fail to do so. 
Note that these considerations apply to any society and not necessarily only to the 
democratic one. This is also true for the conclusion that: “…if there is a noisy signal 
about a player’s type that is at least more accurate than random, trustworthy types will 
survive as a substantial proportion of the population. Noisy signals may result from 
seeing one another, face-to-face communication…” (Ostrom 2000, p.145) This statement 
presumes unconditional pre-exchange, pre-would-be-injustice, trust.  That’s exactly what 
Aristotle presumes too, and arrives at the same conclusion; but he goes one step further 
and asks what is the socioeconomic and political arrangement that would prompt the 
emergence of such unconditional trust in the first place. And, his answer is: unconditional 
cooperation is a matter of free choice, and free choice is maximized only in a democracy. 
He also asks whether unconditional trust should continue to exist after acts of injustice, 
and suggests that it should making at the same time public “noisy-signal” information.  
Indeed, as very well Lubell and Scholz (2001, p. 160) put it: “(1) On average, 
initial cooperators gain a cooperators' advantage over initial defectors due to defectors' 
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inability to take advantage of reciprocal environments; (2) Past experience with 
reciprocity reduces exploitation even when reciprocity is currently absent, while past 
experience with nonreciprocity does not hamper cooperation when reciprocity is 
currently present; and (3) Institutions that punish noncooperation enhance cooperation 
by initial defectors, but reduce cooperation by initial cooperators.” This is why, in 
practice, as for example Kahneman’s et al. (1986, p. S285) remark: “Even profit-
maximizing firms will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived as fair if the 
individuals with whom they deal are willing to resist unfair transactions and punish 
unfair firms at some cost to themselves... willingness to enforce fairness is common.” 
And, in view of the qualification of the concept of reciprocity which is needed in 
the presence of modesty, the kind of modern-day notion of it that might be endorsed by 
Aristotle is perhaps Molm’s (1994, pp. 119-120) “reciprocal exchange”: “In reciprocal 
exchange, actors perform individual acts that benefit another, like giving help or advice, 
without negotiation and without knowing whether or when the other will reciprocate. My 
focus on reciprocal exchange came out of my early training in behavioral sociology 
(Burgess and Bushell 1969); many of the early behavioral experiments were conducted 
under minimal information conditions in which the reciprocal exchange of benefits was 
all that subjects experienced, so reciprocity was very salient.” 
4. Epilogue 
It would be instructive to conclude this paper by asking why the economic and 
non-economic elements are so much interwoven in Book V. This Book is the product of 
circumstances too, which need to be discussed for a thorough picture of it. Toward this 
end, note that: “The agora in Greece does not originally represent the market-place; first 
of all it is closely bound up with the development of the polis as the site of political 
gatherings. Only gradually does it achieve the additional use of a place of internal 
exchange.” (Moller 2000, p. 71) Also, note that in Politics (1331a:19-1331b:18), 
Aristotle proposes the separation of the “free agora” of politicians from the “exchange 
agora”, which indicates the transformation of the political meeting place into a mixed 
political-cum-market place by the 4
th
 century B.C.  
This coupled with the fact that: “Greece in general was much more highly 
monetized in the later fourth century, when Aristotle was writing.” (Trevett 2001, p. 23) 
suggest that the socioeconomic and political environment of those times was one of all 
sorts of imperfectly competitive phenomena, being shaped inter alia by the give-and-take 
of politicians with people of the market, too; see e.g. Lewis 1978). And, Aristotle could 
not possibly separate the two in a discussion of justice, placing the emphasis on the 
sociopolitical rather the economic element in a manner no different than modern-day 
quests for preventing democracy distortions by the economically powerful. His recipe 
was moderation from all sides, as his second fundamental theorem of welfare after he had 
worked out the first such theorem in terms of reciprocal-justice spirited recontracting. 
Moderation even in the lifestyle, because he does know from the Anonymous of 
Iamblichus that people get actively involved in politics only when they do not prosper, 
and emphasizes that prosperity should be identified with autarky, with self-sufficiency: 
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“…we should not be motivated by greed, neither to think that the power needed to satisfy 
greed is a virtue…” (Anonymous of Iamblichus, 1.6.1) As far as the fourth century is 
concerned, autarky extends beyond self-sufficiency in a subsistence economy much as 
modern-day autarky is what most households pursue through supermarket and shopping 
center visits. When riches are condemned by Aristotle, they are not per se but when they 
are used disorderly as a socioeconomic equilibrium destabilizing instrument, propagating 
the disequilibrium stemming out of the practical limitations of recontracting. 
In sum: Bilateral bargaining under reciprocal justice can lead to Pareto efficient, 
envy-free equitable allocations. But, the presence of such justice in exchange is an ideal 
and therefore, in practice bilateral bargaining should be taking place in a recontracting 
fashion so that equilibrium-price tags may be posted in a market place. Yet, recontracting 
has its practical limitations as well, and therefore, only modesty in exchange can prove to 
be market stabilizing. And, modesty as a homo economicus can certainly be the case only 
when modesty is exhibited as a broader virtue not only on the part of the isolated 
individual but also collectively by the polity, which can be the case only in a democracy. 
Aristotle does know of the redistributive practices that a state may engage in. But, 
instead of invoking upon, for example, Samuelson-like lump-sum transfers from the 
young to the elderly within the context of the second welfare theorem to attain 
intergenerational efficiency in a decentralized economy, he prefers to address the homo 
politicus inside the homo economicus, (given that the primary motive for societal 
formations is the economic one). This and the misunderstanding of Euclid’s reciprocal 
figures have been the reasons for the confusion about what Aristotle had to say regarding 
market economic exchange. On economic grounds, he is the ultimate laissez-faire 
advocator, but Ludwig von Mises (1963 [1949]), for instance, cannot proclaim him as 
such, and very rightly so, because simply the economic element is dominated eventually 
by Arnhart’s (1994), for example, sociopolitical darwinism. And, Schumpeter (1954), for 
example, cannot see any economics in Book V, because he cannot appreciate the 
geometry of reciprocal figures, and indeed, there are no economics, only a philosophico-
socio-political discussion, when this geometry is discarded. 
It appears that all those issues in Aristotelian thinking considered to be making 
difficult the reconciliation of this thinking with modern economic theory (see e.g. Pack 
2008), are issues having been addressed herein from the viewpoint that Aristotelian 
economics have to wait for much further development on the part of the “…series of 
disjointed mathematical puzzles, expertise with math in general, sundry game theories, 
detailed experiments demonstrating that people are not fully ‘rational’, etc” (Pack 2008, 
p.275), before they are really comprehended and become systematized toward the 
direction noted by Crespo (2013, 2014) and Jill (2005); before modern economic theory 
comes to become synonymous to Aristotelian economics and by extension to modern 
social science à la Staveren (2001). 
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